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JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction to hear this case 
under Article VIII, Constitution of Utah and Utah Code Ann,, § 
78-2a-3(2)(c). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of § 105, Salt Lake City 
Code (DUI), in the Fifth Circuit Court, State of Utah, and the 
subsequent sentence resulting therefrom, 
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STATUTES AND ORDINANCES INVOLVED 
Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens 
of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Constitution of Utah, Art. I, § 12 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, 
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be 
compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights 
herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled 
to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband 
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense. 
i i i 
Utah Code A n n M § 41-6-44(1) (1953) 
It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this 
section for any person with a blood alcohol content of 
.08% or greater by weight, or who is under the 
influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which 
renders the person incapable of safely driving a 
vehicle, to drive or be in actual physical control of a 
vehicle within this state. The fact that a person 
charged with violating this section is or has been 
legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug does not 
constitute a defense against any charge of violating 
this section. 
Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-44.10(1) (1953) 
Any person operating a motor vehicle in this state 
shall be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical 
test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine for the 
purpose of determining whether he was driving or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having 
a blood alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or 
while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or 
combination of alcohol and any drug as detailed in 
section 41-6-44, so long as the test is or tests are 
administered at the direction of a peace officer having 
grounds to believe that person to have been driving or 
in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while 
having a blood alcohol content statutorily prohibited, 
or while under the influence of alcohol, any drugs, or 
combination of alcohol and any drug as detailed in 
section 41-6-44. A peace officer shall determine which 
of the aforesaid tests shall be administered. 
No person who has been requested under this section to 
submit to a chemical test or tests of his breath, 
blood, or urine, shall have the right to select the 
test or tests to be administered. The failure or 
inability of a peace officer to arrange for any 
specific tests is not a defense with regard to taking a 
test requested by a peace officer and it shall not be a 
defense in any criminal, civil or administrative 
proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit 
to the requested test or tests. 
i v 
Sec. 105, Rev. Ord., Salt Lake City, Utah (198*) 
Users of drugs and intoxicants. It is unlawful and 
punishable as provided in this section for any person 
with a blood alcohol content of .08% or greater by 
weight, or who is under the influence of alcohol or any 
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug 
to a degree which renders the person incapable of 
safely driving a vehicle, to drive or be in actual 
physical control of a vehicle within this city. The 
fact that a person charged with violating this section 
is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a 
drug does not constitute a defense against any charge 
of violating this section. 
Sec. 108, Rev. Ord., Salt Lake City, Utah (1965) 
Intoxicated person in or about vehicle. It shall be 
unlawful for any person under the influence of alcohol 
or any drugs to be in or about any vehicle with the 
intention of driving or operating such vehicle. 
- v -
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal ) 
Corporation, ] 
Plaint iff-Respondent 
vs. ] 
LELAND DENNIS, ) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
i N o . 870107-CA 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented on appeal are: 
I. Did the lower court err by not accepting the defendant's 
offered plea of guilty to the violation of § 108 and sentencing 
him under that section? 
II. Did the lower court err in changing its original ruling 
that sentencing would be on the basis of § 108 after the 
defendant had been found guilty by the jury of violating § 105? 
III. Was the lower court's charge to the jury in 
Instruction No. 16 error? 
IV. Did the lower court err in admitting the intoxilyzer 
test result over objection? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is taken from the verdict of the jury rendered 
on the 18th day of June 1986 and the sentence imposed by the 
court on the 8th day of September, 1986 and further from the 
lower court's refusal to grant a new trial which was finally 
heard and denied on the 23rd day of February 1987. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 24, 1986 the defendant was observed asleep in 
the driver's seat of a vehicle parked on the side of the road 
with the lights on and motor running at 1240 South Foothill 
Blvd., Salt Lake City, Utah by Officer D. W. Holmes of the Salt 
Lake City Police Department. (T. 51) Officer Holmes had been 
called to the scene by another agency and was investigating that 
report. At no time did Officer Holmes observe the defendant 
drive. Officer Holmes requested the defendant to perform several 
field sobriety tests after awakening the defendant and detecting 
an "odor of alcohol11. (T. 54-55) Officer Holmes testified that 
he formed an opinion that the defendant was in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle and was intoxicated and placed him 
under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. (T. 59) 
Officer Holmes testified that he requested the defendant to take 
a breath test and he agreed to do so. (T. 60) If any admonition 
was read to the defendant, no testimony was offered to indicate 
that the provisions of Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-44.10(1) were 
followed. Officer Holmes then requested Officer Brian Jewkes of 
the Salt Lake City Police Department to transport the defendant 
to the Metropolitan Hall of Justice for the purpose of 
administering a chemical breath test. Officer Jewkes testified 
that he was certified to operate the intoxilyzer maintained by 
Salt Lake City and that his certification card erroneously 
reflected that it had expired prior to the date of the test. (T. 
117) He further testified that he administered a chemical test 
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to the defendant, identified the documentation, and those items 
were admitted as Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 over objection. (T. H 3 ) 
Officer Jewkes offered no testimony concerning the defendant's 
actual physical control nor expressed an opinion as to the 
defendant's state of intoxication. 
During the course of the trial the court expressed the view 
that, regardless of the verdict, the court could only impose 
sentence based upon §108 of the City Code. (T. 137, 179, 187) 
Only after the defendant confessed, the City and defendant 
rested, and the jury returned its verdict, did the court express 
the view that its prior ruling meant that the court "might" be 
required to sentence the defendant under §108. (T. 219) Prior to 
that both counsel had been convinced that Judge McCleve would 
only impose the sentence for violating §108 if the defendant was 
convicted. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The provisions of Salt Lake City's D.U.I, law (§ 105) as 
they relate to a person who is not found actually driving, but 
rather is alleged to be in "actual physical control', are not 
distinguishable from the provisions of Salt Lake City's ordinance 
concerning intoxicated persons who are in or about a motor 
vehicle and, accordingly, the court should have allowed the 
defendant to plead guilty to the ordinance which carried the 
lesser penalty. 
After the court did not allow defendant's motion to reduce 
the offense and to charge the lesser offense (but stated it felt 
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compelled to impose sentence according to the lesser penalty, and 
all parties relied and presented their cases based upon that 
understanding), it was fundamentally unfair for the court to 
change its mind and impose sentence under § 105. It was 
particularly inequitable, as stated above, where the original 
ruling was in fact the correct construction of the Revised 
Ordinances of Salt Lake City. 
The lower court instructed the jury in Instruction No. 16 
that "the defendant need not be exercising conscious volition 
with regard to the vehicle" to be in actual physical control "so 
long as the defendant, of his own choice, placed himself behind 
the wheel and either started the motor or allowed it to run." 
That instruction is a misstatement of the law. 
In addition, the effect is to redefine the statutory 
language "actual physical control." The new definition has the 
effect of relieving the city of its burden of proof that the 
defendant was in actual physical control and substitutes that the 
"defendant place himself behind the wheel and either started the 
motor or allowed it to run." Thus, by defining actual physical 
control in the above manner, the city is the beneficiary of a 
mandatory rebuttable presumption which is unconstitutional. 
The officer at whose direction the chemical breath test was 
administered did not have probable cause to believe that the 
defendant was in actual physical control of the vehicle and, in 
fact, the record shows that the defendant was not in actual 
physical control; and, therefore, the lower court erred in 
- * -
a dm i 1: ting the results of the i n t o x i 1 y z e r test o v • o b j e r H o n . 
ARGUMENT 1. 
T H £ L O W E R C Q U R T E R R E D B-v N Q T ACCEPTING T H E DEFENDAN I"' S 
OFFERED PLEA OF GUILTY TO THE VIOLATION OF § 108 \HB 
SENTENCING HIM UNDER THAT SECTION 
Dur , • . ' - * '* r .r rid t * 
sentence unde * . ^-or* : rn* * - K»- V -r nafs e^ 
relating * c itoxicatec' ^ * •
 r ~ -
vehir'. 
the .* . - • * * - - '^  , ' f,ie Re\.ser ' 1 i" ^  * • ,oKr 
C i t ) ^ e r i n c i u u e u o i i e n b e wi L m u 3 ±u> oi l i ie 
R e v I s e d O r d i n a n c e s o f S a 11 Lake C11 y , I ! t ah . 
* 105 • • • * > • : 
"It is unlawful and punish a b 1 e a s provided in 11 11 s 
section for any person with a blood alcohol content of 
.08% or g re ater by we i g h t, o r who is under the 
influence of alcohol or any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which 
renders the person incapable of safely driving a 
vehicle, to drive or be in actual pi lysical control of a • 
vehicle within this city. The fact that a person 
-. charged with violating tf 11 s section Is or has been 
legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug does not 
constitute a defense against any charge of violating 
tl 11 s sect i on , " 
§ 108 prov ides : 
"It shall be unlawfu ior ar person under the 
influence of alcohol or d drugs be in or about any 
vehicle with the •*• r.*- • *f dri- ^ - operating such 
veh ic1e . " 
T h e s o l e d i s t i n < t i o n b e t w e e n § I OK a n d k 1 0 5 t o t h e I n s t a r i l 
s i t: d a I i oi l i 'i win!" 1 lif i I lif1 <1e f e n d , i n f wa s i in ai I I M I phi y s i < .) I i n n t r o I 
o f t h e m o t o i v e h I c 1 e . 
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A comparison of the elements of the two offenses illustrates 
no difference between the substance of the two sections. 
Section 108 Section 105 
It shall be unlawful for 
any person 
under the influence of alco-
hol or any drugs 
to be in or about with the 
intention of driving or oper 
ating such vehicle 
any vehicle 
It is unlawful and punishable 
as provided in this section 
for 
any person 
with a blood alcohol content 
of .08% or greater by weight, 
or who is under the influence 
of alcohol or any drug, or the 
combined influence of alcohol 
or any drug to a degree which 
renders the person incapable 
of safely driving a vehicle 
to drive or be in actual 
physical control of a vehicle 
a vehicle within this city 
The foregoing comparison of the two Salt Lake City 
ordinances illustrates that § 108 describes an offense in which 
every violation of § 105 must necessarily be included. § 108 
carves out a much larger area of prohibited conduct in that § 108 
does not require actual driving or actual physical control, but 
merely the intention of driving or operating. 
In the instant case there was no evidence, and the City 
concedes, that the defendant was not "driving." The City's sole 
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contention was tha f * "^ndant was in art 
which is somehow *-*,'-,£..>,• ' * * . - : O ' * o* . 
tlw k'p^'ispij Mr d ina iKe Liiy, uian. 
If shnu hi hv ** ic p a p a ! ,*1 f o Utah Code A n n . , 
§ ii t . f».. 4 4(1) ( 1 ^  *> i ) ; I i owe v e r , § 10 8 I i a s n < > s I m i 1 a r s t a t u t o r y 
pi o\ i * ion , In Ga r c i a v . S c h we n d 11 na i i, 64,5 P 2 d 651 at 65 4 (1 It ah 
19 8 2 ) lus t i i'f Dur h a m sal d , 
A s a m a t t e r o f p u b l i c p o l i c y a n d s t at ut o r ) 
c o n s t r uc t i on , we be 1 i e v e that the ,fac t ual phy s i ca 1 
c o n t r o l " l a n g u a g e of U t a h ' s i m p l i e d c o n s e n t s t a t u t e 
s h o u l d be read as i n t e n d i n g to p r e v e n t i n t o x i c a t e d 
d r i v e r s f r oi r i en t er I ng t! ie I r \ eh i c 1 e s e x c e p t as 
p a s s e n g e r s o i p a s s I v e o c c u p a i 11 s . , 
W1 11 Ie t i 11 s a n a 1y s I s p ro v i d e s a n a d e q u a t e e x p l a n a t i o n of U t a h 
C o d e A n n , , ',i h i <. 4 0 ( 1 ) (19 53 ) , t h e s a m e c a n ha r«1 1 y be u s e d to 
e x p l a i n S 1 ^ r> for the si m p l e reason that $ lUX r o v e r s the same 
t e r r i t o r y , 4 108 was e n a r t e d for the same p u r p o s e as the S u p r e m e 
C o g i s I ,i I ur *j " ". e n.K fine n ! o f 
tk- artuai ;) ^ v ^ : a i . - n * - - p - . - i U t a h C o d e A n n , , § 4 1-6-
b+\i) <195 ; 
It is s i I t •! i in I 1:1: e :! 1 1 i a t w h e i i S a 1 1: I a I c e C i I:) r e \ I s e d § 1 0 5 o f 
1:t ie or d i n a n c e s 1:o r ead ve r bat Im as the pr o \ I s i ons of U t a h C o d e 
An1!.-.? *  ' 1 - o - t t v w * <Asi • ~t .^
 vi dt 
least iii l e g i ^ h t i v f 1 
"I h , t h e d e f i * * r • r f A I-^- •* *-i* ' - r a ^ e 
"di t u i 1 c o n t r « ! " * . J U I n in i ne i t d ? • ^ t an 
m a k e th* ^ n <; r* f ^<; anpl if»d to + se, 
indistinguishable e x c e p t a s t o p e n a 1 t:) 
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ARGUMENT II 
THE COURT ERRED BY NOT SENTENCING THE DEFENDANT IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF § 108, REVISED 
ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH. 
A. 
Judge McCleve ruled that the defendant could only be 
sentenced under § 108 even if the jury found the defendant guilty 
of § 105 in response to the discussion between counsel concerning 
a lesser included offense jury instruction. (T. 137) The 
prosecutor vehemently argued against the judge's ruling to the 
point where Judge McCleve suggested any further argument would be 
contemptuous of the court. (T. 179; 181) 
It is clear that both counsel understood that the defendant 
would only be sentenced under the provisions of § 108 (T. 187) 
and it was only after the jury had returned a verdict that the 
court explained that she had meant to say, "I might be required 
to sentence on the lesser." (T. 219) 
Based upon the court's ruling, the defendant had offered to 
plead guilty to the charge of § 108, the prosecutor had offered 
to allow defendant to plead guilty to § 105 and be sentenced 
under § 108. Clearly, it is impermissible to force a criminal 
defendant to be treated differently merely because he exercises 
hi s r ight to trial. 
It is clear that a trial court may not make a judicial 
pronouncement that sentencing will be done under § 108 (an 
infraction), allow all parties to rely upon those statements, 
allow the defendant to plead guilty to § 105 with the 
- 8 -
un-'-e -' s t a n d i n g t h a t u~ w i ! ' h- ^^nt^n^^A nnH^r § 108 and, dl lei 
accept r^ - ?* •> -i imp:>s<* science and* 
(See State * ^ay, 7i T a n s x i t u t i o n oi 
U n i t e d Sta'- . A m e n d , X I V C o n s t ! • f n + -K Art 
12) 
L i kewi sp , the same con s i clr r a I i mi s o 1 I undamr' n t a I l" 4 I r ne s s 
e m b o d i e d in due p r o c e s s as set forth in K a y , s u p r a, and 
San to be I lo v . N e w \ ork , k 0 k U . S . ? *> •' ( 1 9 7 1 ) , r o m p el * similar 
r e s u l t w h e r e all p a r t i e s rely on a | iJd ^  e ' s s t a t e iHJ II I \ u n e n d i n g 
s e n t e n c i n g m a d e d u r i n g trial and r e t r a c t e d only after the f iIr y 
r e i mi n s a vr i ii i i r . 
he a r g u e d that surh e r r c r is h a r m l e s s ; h o w e v e r , it 
m u s t uc n e a r that w h e r e a d e f e n d a n t Is med to b e l i e v e that 
r e g a r d l e s s of the vet • :! I ct : f 11 ie j i ir ; I ie v i 1 I b e sei 11ei iced t o a n 
i n f r a c t i o n (k I 0 & ) r a t h e r t h a n 1 h e s e r 11 e nce f or a D. 1 1. I (§ 105), 
I hi i • conduct of* his defense is n o I 1 h e s ame a s i t wo u I d he if he 
\s aware of the fart that, il found J:IMI I 1 I y , he will laer I he 
D.U.I, penalties. 
Mi 11 (MM i in , I 11 c d ccision o i i n e aeiefidaiii ' s - - * i • '• n 
h i s o w n b e h a l f a n d i'ppf<*** t h a t t h p r e a s o n i • s 
- o \ * ^i •' - f- - * I * ~ p b " ..s a *- ** f e * - ' - was 
iui m e t , Wdb p i e d i C d i e o ipon 
our * . , a h*a c o n t e n r p H under : e 
- * e n a a n i • s 
c o n f e s s i o n in Ins c l o s i n g s t a t e m e n t and that c o n f e s s i o n w a s m a d e 
only after the court ruled that she would sentence the defendant 
under § 108 if the jury found him guilty of § 105. 
B. 
The court's initial ruling that sentencing of the defendant 
should be under § 108 rather than § 105 was, in fact, the correct 
ruling and it was error to sentence the defendant under § 105. 
§ 105 is identical in all respects to Utah Code Ann., § 41-
6-44(1) (1953). On the other hand, there is no Utah statute 
similar to § 108. If the Supreme Court's definition and 
construction of the "actual physical control" language is applied 
to § 108, then the intent of the City Council was to prevent 
"intoxicated drivers from entering their vehicles except as 
passengers or passive occupants." (See Garcia, supra, at 654) 
Such a legislative intend applied to § 105 makes little 
sense inasmuch as the clear language of § 108 appears to be 
designed to prevent intoxicated persons from being in or about 
vehicles with the intention of driving or operating. 
If the purpose of the two sections is to prevent the same 
conduct, then a defendant convicted of violating either is 
entitled to the benefit of the lesser penalty. [State v. 
Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969); State v. Kish, 503 P.2d 1208 
(Utah 1972); Rammell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977); State 
v. Loveless, 581 P.2d 575 (Utah 1978); State v. Fair, 456 P.2d 
168 (Utah 1969)] 
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ARGl IMEN 1 1 I I 
THE LOWER COURT1 S CHARGE TO THE 3'URY IN INSTRUCTION NO. 
16 CON^T!T i f TFn ERROR 
I t w a . -'. ' -. " ' : *' • t o st ib' n i t Ir t s t r u c t i o n N : 16 t o 
1 1 l e j i in y . 
Y o u are i n s t r u c t e d that to be in 'actual p h y s i c a l 
c o n t r o l 1 of a mo t o r v e h i c l e the d e f e n d a n t need not be 
e x e r c i s i n g c o n s c i o u s v o l i t i o n with i e g a r d to the 
ve h i c l e and 11 ie veh I c 1 e need not be in m o t i o n , so long 
as the d e f e n d a n t , of his own c h o i c e , p l a c e d h i m s e l f 
b e h i n d the w h e e l , either s t a r t e d the mot o r or a l l o w e d 
T i n s loaue w, * 'uuiiuiicu u* * • ^/* r>- T% 185:^ 'isd 
was a c c e p t e d by d e f e n s e r o u n s e ! , - ^  * * e 
pr o s e c u t o r I !ui t the I a n g u a g e -a * • * i»" * r - * > ^ • * % - Ga r c i a v . 
Sc h w e nd iman • No ob)e< I ioi \ b ra i b e u , even uiuu;- -a' - wda nut 
a v a i l a b l e 1 n h* tea«f at * - +»™~ ^ ^ v i ^ ^f - ••r^ erutnr ? $ 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . ( I , ? H ; I r ~ •
 t * ^ ^ : P- 'r isf ^ became 
refer ^n ? nr losing 
a r g u m e n t . • *^ * <- r^>
 d r i , ± &A . the 
n n i n i o n u a r c i a v « > c hwe n d i ma n g 
. , ;.- < * % -< ' ^ > • - 2 5 ; 
light • - *<--- * oi ^ i^,: ^  * *- e,r- — e m p h a s i s 
: u o n lxo.
 t m e ' - w c u imve d e c i d e d the case 
*
r
» ^ + i o n 
^ * * N o 1 is i s ,i i in i s % t a t e r n e n t n f t h e * ) a w 11 n d * MI t h e 
f i n I ( < t i i I! If in in i s .vi i s 1 f I 11 h c h I n d tint* w h r e l , 
and had been for approximately two hours and fifteen minutes at 
the time the officer woke him up. (T. 172:15-22; 173:2-9) Garcia 
clearly states at page 654, footnote 3, 
•...but nothing in the record warrants a finding that 
the plaintiff was physically unable to start the car, 
as would be the case with an unconscious or sleeping 
mo t o r i s t . " 
Under Ga r c i a, Dennis was not in actual physical control of the 
vehicle. When a jury instruction misstates the law, the 
conviction must be reversed in order to prevent manifest 
injustice, even if no objection was m a d e . [State v. Lesley, 672 
P.2d 79 (Utah 1 9 8 3 ) , at 81] 
Additionally, Instruction No. 16 is erroneous because it 
shifts the burden of proof by not requiring the prosecution to 
prove one of the elements, to wit: intent. State v. Bugger, 483 
P.2d 442 (Utah 1 9 7 1 ) , at 443, defined actual physical control. 
"The term in 'actual physical control' in its ordinary sense 
means 'existing' or 'present bodily restraint, directing 
influence, dominion or regulation'." In other words, some intent 
or conscious volition is required. 
Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651 (Utah 1 9 8 2 ) , at 653, 
adopts the definition of Bugger
 t and Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 
P.2d 778 (Utah 1 9 8 6 ) , at 721, adopts Garcia and Bugger with 
respect to the definition of actual physical control. 
Instruction No. 16 removes the element of intent or 
conscious volition required by Bugger, Ga r c i a, and L o p e z . 
Therefore, it is an instruction using a mandatory rebuttable 
presumption, which is unconstitutional. [State v. Chambers, 709 
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P. 2d *?! (Utah 1985)] 
ARGUMENT IV 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED ..* ,\„ I'iNo IHL INTOXILYZER TEST 
RESULT OVER OBJECTION 
U n d e r L u c 1 a c t o u . J C a O C J L u c , * * ' J * ' jLv O l I l C & i 
probable ransp to eivp :^ndant a rh^ml ^ -«atH t#**t 
implied conse * i- Utah Code A n n . . ^ - *- -* 
requi res tnat D C * • * • ' 
must hav^ r o^^ . •- *>-i ; i . * A I 
v e h i c l - *' i n f l u e n c e ^ ^ 
N > * - v r>, The 
p e r s o n * ' <-' * * : ^ *-.i ^ *- ' ^ . M * M ' H ; a Mure civ \J,iiy o f 
( r 61 :15 * • ^ nn h i s r a d i n . T h i s 
wa s o v e f 1 \ e -. M l . e 4 > -ru • ^ ^ A .. *' * * x a ; t L -i - »-
policy ofiiLci ~ * * •< o tnt 
investigatina_ " ^  o rk n " , ^ * .. -
a'" •' - «'* e n c * M t ,, .  u
 r , * .^  ;<e s ^  >A-h M 1 -
app*-w P~. *<- v t e n to m i e e n mi n u n 
() *"h P r P i ^ r\r\ t o c t i mr» rv \r
 r 
cone** f n r . * £ - * ~ - *• • T, 
I n 
was "~~e
 ; - , f . - • l i • : ,ir, *tv 
c o n t r o l , i i <*; i • ^ - i ^ f e n d a n •« . •< 
Of 1 i i PI" Ho 
v e h i c I e w i ' - *• ~ ~;;
 3 - ^ c
1 -
. ' 
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52:2-8, 19-24; 62:20-23) 
The controlling case law concerning such fact situations in 
Utah are State v. Bugger, 483 P.2d 442 (Utah 1971), Garcia v. 
Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651 (Utah 1982), and Lopez v. Schwendiman, 
720 P.2d 778 (Utah 1986). 
In the Bugger case, defendant was asleep in his automobile 
which was parked on the shoulder of the road, completely off the 
traveled portion of the highway, with the motor turned off. The 
officer had trouble awakening the defendant. The court held that 
Bugger was not in actual physical control of the vehicle. In the 
instant case, defendant Dennis was found asleep behind the wheel 
of the vehicle with the motor running and the lights turned on. 
(T. 51:19-22; 52:2-8, 19-24; 62:20-23) The officer had a great 
deal of difficulty in awakening Dennis. (T. 52:19-24; 62:14-23) 
Some confusion exists in the record as to whether Dennis1 
automobile was completely pulled off the travel portion of the 
roadway. Officer Holmes testified that he received information 
that there was a vehicle parked in the outside lane. (T. 51:19-
20) However, it should be noted that no attempt was made to move 
defendant's vehicle, and Officer Jewkes testified that when he 
arrived, "There was a van pulled over on the side of the road and 
another police vehicle with the overhead lights on, to the - - a 
little bit to the left and rear of it." (T. 71:19-21) This 
strongly implies that defendant's van was properly parked. In 
addition, Dennis testified that he was lost and pulled over into 
a parking area in order to get a map out and try to decide which 
- 14 -
way was the best way home He then decided to go to sleep. 
(1 16 1:23 -25; 162:1.-2) 
I n Garcia v. Schwendiman , 6 4 5 I > 2 d 6 5 1 (1 11 a I i 19 8 2 ) , 11 i e 
p l a i n t i f f w a s o b s e r v e d a l o n e i n t h e ve h i c 1 e b e h in d t h e s t e e r i n g 
w h e e 1 in t h e p r o c e s s o f s t a i t: 11 i g 1 i i s rno t o r v e h i c i e by a t t e m p t i n g 
!: i gi i i t i oi i . 1 h e r e w a s s o m e di s p u t e as to the e x a c t 
1 o c a 11 o n o f t h e k e y , h o w e v e r , i 1: i s i 11 i d i s p i I t e d 11 i a t G a r c i a h a d 
e x c l u s i v e p o s s e s s i o n a n d c o n t r o l of t h e ke y , !:|> t p a g e 6 5 4 t h e 
c o u r t h e l d , 
"Wh e r e a m o t o r i s t o c c u p i e d 11 i e d i I \ e r ' s p osi t i o n be hind 
the s t e e r i n g w h e e l w i t h p o s s e s s i o n of the ignit i o n key 
an d w i t h the a p p a r e n t a b i l i t y to start and m o v e the 
v e h i c l e , we hold t h a t 11 i e i e 1 i a s b e e i t a n adequate 
showing of f ac t ua 1 phy s i ca 1 cont ro1 ' u n d e r oi Ii imp1i ed 
c o n s e n t s t a t u t e . " 
I n t h e G a r c i a c a s e , the d r i v e r w a s c l e a r l y a w a k e b e h i n d t h e 
wheel. I x D e n n i s w a s cl e a r l y
 a s i e e p . ("1 
I n G a r c i a , * ^  HI t o s 1: a t e (p . 6 5 4 , f oo t no t e 3 ) 
" N o t h. -* r
 A.i tut l e c o r u ^ d r i d i u a a i i n u i n g m a t tne f *a s 
f < v' u n a b l e t n < i t 3 r t t h p rnr ^ c w o 11 1 H K o t ^ <. d ^ *' A t fI a VX 
uncons-i, . '"i*." £ iu^^r , here' •» , Garcia, 
Dennis w o u i u uu" ' ± 11 aciuai pnysic«, 
1n Lopez v. Schwendiman, 72 0 P.2d 778 (1 11ah 19 86), Lopez was 
found sitting in the driver's %rat with ti i s lirad lestinp on the 
s t e e r i n y w h e t 1 I T h e I i in k " ". imi I H I \\ i s n o l i I I I I H i \\\ , I ln> i i I A C I P 
v e h i c l e t r a c k s t r o m t h e p i c k u p in tlie I f e s h I > i a l l e n s n o w I h e 
c o u r i i^eld t h a t p l a i n t i f f w a s in . K f uia I p h y s i c a l c o n t r o l o i I h e 
v< *• H o 1 * e \ ei: i 1: sI moi 11 J i io t e d t h a t n l a i n t i f f w a s c l e a r 1 y 
awake at the time the officer approached him. "Lopez was sitting 
in the driver's seat with his head resting on the steering wheel. 
Shofield tapped on the window, assisted Lopez in opening the door 
to talk to him, and had to catch him when he fell more than 
stepped out of his truck." In the instant case, Dennis was 
asleep. Additionally, it is apparent that Dennis had been asleep 
for approximately two hours and fifteen minutes at the time the 
officer woke him up. (T. 161:20-21; 162:1-2; 172:20-22) 
Lopez continues and states the current rationale concerning 
w h a t c o n s t i t u t e s actual physical control under similar 
circumstances. At page 779 the court states, 
The court's upholding convictions in these and similar 
fact situations start out from the premise that as long 
as a person is physically able to assert dominion by 
starting the car and driving away, he has substantially 
as much control over the vehicle as if he were actually 
driving it....Utah's statute provides for the arrest of 
one in actual physical control of the vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs. That 
requirement was intended by our legislature to protect 
public safety and apprehend the drunken driver before 
he or she st r i kes. 
It is clear from the testimony in the instant case that 
Dennis took his last drink at about 9:20 p.m. He left at about 
9:30 p.m. and arrived at the scene at approximately 9:45 p.m. 
He was lost, consulted a map in order to attempt to find a way 
home, felt the effects of alcohol coming upon him and decided to 
go to sleep. (T. 161:7-25; 162:1-8) He had been asleep for 
approximately two hours and fifteen minutes before the officer 
woke him up. (T. 172:15-22; 173:2-9) Thus, it seems clear that 
Dennis' intentional stopping of his vehicle, pulling it off into 
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a parking area of the roadway and going to sleep because he felt 
the effects of alcohol coming on and did not want to drive, 
satisfies the requirement of "....to protect public safety and 
apprehend the drunken driver before he or she strikes." (Lopez, 
supra, at 779) 
Under the facts of the case, there was no probable cause to 
give defendant a chemical breath test. Defendant was not 
observed driving and defendant was not in actual physical control 
of his vehicle. 
Moreover, it should be noted that Officer Holmes arrested 
defendant (T. 59) and was presumably the peace officer who had 
grounds to believe defendant was in actual physical control, yet 
he did not perform the chemical test or the intoxilyzer. He 
turned the defendant over to Officer Jewkes who transported 
defendant to the Metropolitan Hall of Justice and at whose 
direction the test was administered. Officer Jewkes testified 
that Officer Holmes had requested him to do so (T. 71,72,77) but 
he offered no testimony which would support the contention that 
he was a peace officer who had "grounds to believe that person 
(defendant) to have been....in actual physical control." (See 
Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-44.10(1) (1953). 
CONCLUSION 
The conviction and sentence of the defendant in the above-
captioned matter should be set aside, reversed and remanded with 
directions to the lower court to amend its information to charge 
the defendant with a violation of § 108. 
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